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Asian Americans for Equality v. Koch: The
Battle Over Affordable Housing
I. Introduction
In deciding the case of Asian Americans for Equality v.
Koch,1 the First Department of the New York Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, was called upon to resolve whether the
City of New York properly exercised its zoning power in cre-
ating the Special Manhattan Bridge District (SMBD) in Chi-
natown.2 The Appellate Division refused to extend to New
York the principles established by the New Jersey Supreme
Court in Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township
of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel 1)' and Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel
I)" and held that the zoning amendments met the standard
established by the New York Court of Appeals in Berensen v.
Town of New Castle5 by specifically taking into account the
needs of the low- and moderate-income families in the area.'
Since the SMBD zoning amendments do not require that ad-
ditional low- and moderate-income housing be constructed7
despite a demonstrated need,8 the court's holding is signifi-
cant because it did not impose an affirmative obligation on
municipalities to provide affordable housing for low-income
families.
1. 129 Misc. 2d 67, 492 N.Y.S.2d 837 (1985), afl'd, 128 A.D.2d 99, 514 N.Y.S.2d
939 (1st Dep't 1987).
2. Asian Americans For Equality v. Koch, 128 A.D.2d 99, 100, 514 N.Y.S.2d 939,
940 (1st Dep't 1987).
3. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975) (Mount Laurel I).
4. 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983) (Mount Laurel II).
5. 38 N.Y.2d 102, 110, 341 N.E.2d 236, 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672, 680 (1975).
6. Asian Americans, 128 A.D.2d at 118, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 951.
7. New York City, N.Y., Dep't of City Planning, Zoning Resolution, ch. 6, art.
XI, §§ 116-00 to -70 (June 22, 1981).
8. New York City Dep't of City Planning, Manhattan Bridge Area Study: China-
town (Sept. 1979) [hereinafter Study].
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After an analysis of the issue of zoning and affordable
housing as presented in New Jersey's Mount Laurel cases and
New York's Berensen v. Town of New Castle and Suffolk
Housing Services v. Town of Brookhaven,9 this note analyzes
the Appellate Division's decision in Asian Americans, and
compares the rationale behind the majority's decision with
Justice Carro's dissenting opinion. It concludes by arguing
that the current interpretation of New York law is ripe for
adjustment to today's environment.
II. Background
A. Mount Laurel I and Mount Laurel II
The issues of zoning restrictions and affordable housing
requirements were analyzed extensively by the New Jersey
Supreme Court in Mount Laurel 11° and Mount Laurel I.'
In the first of these two leading cases, the New Jersey Su-
preme Court struck down suburban zoning restrictions on
multifamily dwelling units, which by virtue of impeding the
development of lower-cost housing, effectively prevented low-
and moderate-income persons from living reasonably near
their places of employment.12 Mount Laurel II required that
developing New Jersey communities employ a number of af-
firmative steps to provide lower income housing. 3 In Mount
Laurel I, the New Jersey Supreme Court used the general
welfare premise"' for the first time to attack exclusionary zon-
ing ordinances by introducing the concepts of "fair share"' 5
9. See, Suffolk Housing Services v. Town of Brookhaven, 109 A.D.2d 323, 491
N.Y.S.2d 396 (1985), aff'd, 70 N.Y.2d 122, 517 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1987) (the court de-
clined to hold a zoning ordinance unconstitutional because it did not facilitate the
development of low- and moderate-income housing).
10. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
11. 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983).
12. Mount Laurel 1, 67 N.J. at 186-87, 336 A.2d at 731-32.
13. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 261-77, 456 A.2d at 443-51.
14. The court stated that "the general welfare which developing municipalities
like Mount Laurel must consider extends beyond their boundaries and cannot be pa-
rochially confined .... " Mount Laurel 1, 67 N.J. at 179, 336 A.2d at 727-28.
15. Mount Laurel I never adequately defined the term "fair share." It merely
stated that a developing municipality's obligation to provide low- and moderate-




and "regional needs. '" In New Jersey, a municipality, having
been delegated the power to zone by the state, "must [now]
affirmatively plan and provide a reasonable opportunity for a
variety of housing [types], including low- and moderate-in-
come housing, to meet the needs of all prospective
residents. ' 17
Although the Mount Laurel litigation focused upon de-
veloping suburban communities where lower-income housing
had often been entirely excluded, the court in Mount Laurel
II recognized that general welfare obligations must logically
apply to the inner city as well. 8 The court reaffirmed its origi-
nal holding, clearly identified the communities subject to it
and placed an affirmative obligation on those municipalities to
take various steps to secure the construction of low- and mod-
erate- income housing.19
B. Berenson v. Town of New Castle
In Berenson v. Town of New Castle,20 which was decided
and prospective regional need therefor." Id. at 174, 336 A.D.2d at 724. Mount Laurel
II explained "fair share" by providing general formulas to be applied by municipali-
ties. 92 N.J. at 248-58, 456 A.2d at 436-51.
16. Similarly, Mount Laurel I failed to adequately define "regional needs" and
created considerable confusion as to how the region's needs were to be defined.
Mount Laurel 11, 92 N.J. at 205, 456 A.2d at 413. In defining "regional needs," the
court in Mount Laurel II combined "regional needs" with "fair share" and came up
with three elements to be considered: (a) a determination of the region; (b) an assess-
ment of the housing need in the region, and (c) an allocation of that need. Mount
Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 220-23, 456 A.2d at 421-22.
17. Dobkin, Smith, and Tockman, Symposium: Litigation and Legislation For
Affordable Housing, 13 Rev. L. and Soc. Change 911, 919 (1984-85).
18. "Every municipality's land use regulations should provide a realistic oppor-
tunity for decent housing for at least some part of its resident poor who now occupy
dilapidated housing. The zoning power is no more abused by keeping out the region's
poor than by forcing out the resident poor." Mount Laurel 11, 92 N.J. at 214, 456
A.2d at 418.
19. The municipal obligation to provide a realistic opportunity for the construc-
tion of its fair share of low and moderate incoming housing may require more than
the elimination of unnecessary cost-producing requirements and restrictions. Affirma-
tive governmental devices should be used to make that opportunity realistic including
lower income density bonuses and mandatory set asides [of low income housing.] Fur-
thermore, the municipality should cooperate with the developer's attempts to obtain
federal subsidies. Id. at 215, 456 A.2d at 419.
20. 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975).
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by the New York Court of Appeals post-Mount Laurel I but
pre-Mount Laurel II, the issue centered specifically on the va-
lidity of a zoning ordinance of the Town of New Castle which
excluded multi-family residential housing from the list of per-
mitted uses. The development of multi-family dwellings was
not being permitted in any of the twelve districts of the
town. 1 The court held that in determining the validity of
such an ordinance, the general purposes which the concept of
zoning seeks to serve must be considered.22 "The primary goal
of a zoning ordinance must be to provide for the development
of a balanced, cohesive community which will make efficient
use of the town's available land. 23
In determining whether the ordinance met such goals, the
court established a two-part test.2 4 The first branch of the test
is whether the town has provided a properly balanced and
well-ordered plan for the community at present and in the fu-
ture, 5 and the second part requires that consideration be
given to regional needs and requirements. 6
Furthermore, in search of out-of-state precedent, the New
York Court of Appeals in Berenson noted that the ordinances
involved there and in the Mount Laurel litigation were simi-
lar.27 Hence, it is not unfathomable to view the New York
Court of Appeals decision in Berenson as being influenced by
the principles established in Mount Laurel J.21
21. Id. at 105-06, 341 N.E.2d at 239, 378 N.Y.2d at 676.
22. Id. at 109, 341 N.E.2d at 241, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 680.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 110, 341 N.E.2d at 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 681.
25. The Court explained that such balancing must include consideration of what
types of housing presently exist, and whether this array adequately meets the present
needs of the town. Also, it must be determined whether new construction is neces-
sary, and if so, what forms the new developments ought to take. Id. at 110-11, 341
N.E.2d at 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 680-81.
26. There must be a balancing of the local desire to maintain the status quo
within the community and the greater public interest that regional needs be met ....
[T]he court, in examining the ordinance, should take into consideration not only the
general welfare of the residents of the zoning township, but should also consider the
effect of the ordinance on the neighboring communities. Id.
27. Id. at 108-109, 341 N.E.2d at 241, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 679.
28. Brief for Respondent at 15-16, Asian Americans For Equality v. Koch, 128




Five years later, in Robert E. Kurzius v. Village of Upper
Brookville,29 issues similar to those presented in Berenson
were litigated in New York. Although the Court of Appeals
found that the appellants had failed to meet the two-part test
of Berenson,3 ° it also considered whether there was an "exclu-
sionary purpose behind [the] zoning ordinance.""1 This addi-
tional factor, whether an ordinance has an "exclusionary pur-
pose" is now considered to be the third part of the test
applied by New York State courts when evaluating a zoning
ordinance.2
C. Suffolk Housing Services v. Town of Brookhaven
In Suffolk Housing Services v. Town of Brookhaven,33 the
plaintiffs, a coalition of low-income individuals and organiza-
tions concerned with lower income housing needs, sought a
judgment, inter alia, "declaring the zoning ordinance of the
Town of Brookhaven void in its entirety because of the
Town's failure to exercise its zoning power (Town Law § 261)
to enable development of sufficient low-cost shelter." '34 In ad-
dition, the plaintiffs sought an order requiring the Town to
"take affirmative action to rectify the perceived housing
shortage. 35
The lower court in Suffolk Housing divided the issues
29. 51 N.Y.2d 338, 414 N.E.2d 680, 434 N.Y.S.2d 180 (1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 1042 (1981).
30. Id. at 347, 414 N.E.2d at 685, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 184.
31. Id. at 345, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 183. The court stated:
Generally then, a zoning ordinance enacted for a statutorily permitted pur-
pose will be invalidated only if it is demonstrated that it actually was enacted
for an improper purpose or if it was enacted without giving proper regard to
local and regional housing needs and had an exclusionary effect. Once an ex-
clusionary effect coupled with a failure to balance the local desires with hous-
ing needs has been proved, then the burden of otherwise justifying the ordi-
nance shifts to the defendant ....
Id.
32. Nolon, A Comparative Analysis of the New Jersey's Mount Laurel Cases
With the Berenson Cases in New York, 4 Pace Envt'l L. Rev. 3, 8 (Fall 1986).
33. 109 A.D.2d 323, 491 N.Y.S.2d 396 (1985), aff'd, 70 N.Y.2d 122, 517 N.Y.S.2d
924 (1987).
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into two parts: (1) whether the doctrine articulated in Beren-
son imposed a duty upon a municipality to exercise its zoning
powers in order to facilitate the development of low- to mod-
erate-income or low-cost housing,s" and (2) whether the ac-
tions taken by the municipality with regard to various appli-
cations to develop federally subsidized, multiple-family
housing for low- to moderate-income families violated the
Federal Fair Housing Act. 7
The lower court in Suffolk Housing interpreted Berenson
to "[m]erely require that a town allow for the construction of
different types of housing in sufficient numbers for those peo-
ple who want and can afford it."38 In affirming the lower
court's holding, the New York Court of Appeals limited the
scope of its review to the "affirmed findings" of the lower
court, rejecting the claim of illegitimate implementation of the
ordinance, and thus did not address whether the standards es-
tablished in Berenson applied to the facts at issue. 9
III. Facts of the Asian Americans Case
A. The Manhattan Bridge Area Study
In September 1979, the New York City Planning Com-
mission published the Manhattan Bridge Area Study.'0 The
Study examined a part of the Chinatown area of Manhattan"
from the viewpoint of land use planning. The Study focused
36. Suffolk Housing, 109 A.D.2d at 330-33, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 401-03.
37. Id. at 333-38, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 403-07. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (1968).
38. Id. at 331, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 402.
39. Suffolk Housing, 70 N.Y.2d at 130, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 926.
40. Study, supra note 8. The Study was prepared and published by the New
York City Department of City Planning in 1979. The Study enumerated the various
functions of the Chinatown area: (a) as a point of entry for new Chinese/Asian immi-
grants; (b) as a housing resource for low-income people; (c) as a major tourist attrac-
tion, and (d) as a center of Chinese culture and services.
41. Generally, the Manhattan Bridge Area Study encompassed much of the
lower East Side. Within that area, the Study's primary focus was on the smaller Chi-
natown Study Area, bounded generally by Delancey Street on the north, Allen Street
on the east, Monroe and Madison Streets on the south, and Baxter Street and Bow-
ery on the west. In addition, attention was given to a still smaller area known as Old
Chinatown, bounded by Canal Street on the north, Bowery on the east, Worth Street




mainly on the residential and commercial planning needs of
the area.4 In general, the factual findings of the Study sup-
port the conclusion that there is a compelling need in the Dis-
trict for additional lower-income housing.43 With the excep-
tion of a small group of professionals and business persons,
most of the residents of the Study area "remain at the bottom
of the economic ladder.""' According to the Study, "[t]he up-
per floors of the tenements in Old Chinatown are generally
overcrowded,"' 5 and the demand for low-income housing in
the area will be "heavy" in the upcoming future due to ex-
pected higher levels of immigration into Chinatown."" In fact,
for the next decade, the apartments of non-Chinese tenants
vacating the old housing stock will be the primary source of
housing for the expanding Chinese-American community in
Chinatown.' 7
The Study also found that there was little construction of
new housing within Chinatown. A major reason for this lack of
new construction was that the existing density of Chinatown
tenements was substantially higher than the density permit-
ted under the currently existing zoning regulations."8 The
Study concluded, however, that although construction of new,
affordable housing is necessary, "new housing, financed either
privately or through public programs is not a realistic possi-
bility for meeting the majority of the area's housing needs."'"
As a result of the Study, the Special Manhattan Bridge Dis-
trict ("SMBD") was created.
B. The Special Manhattan Bridge District
On August 20, 1981, the Board of Estimate adopted the Dis-
trict amendments establishing the SMBD and setting forth
the procedures for the application of a special permit, upon
42. Id.
43. Id. at 44, 55.
44. Id. at 13.
45. Id. at 17
46. Id. at 44.
47. Id. at 45.
48. Id. at 55.
49. Id. at 57.
1987]
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request to the City Planning Commission, to construct or ren-
ovate housing in the area.50 This resolution was designed to
preserve the residential character of the Chinatown commu-
nity, to permit new construction which is sensitive to the ex-
isting urban design character of the neighborhood, to provide
an incentive for a mixture of income groups, to encourage de-
velopment of new community facility space and to promote
the rehabilitation of the existing older housing stock in the
area." The resolution was meant to encourage the develop-
ment of new housing on sites which require minimal residen-
tial relocation. 2 Additionally, to qualify for a special permit
under the District provisions, a site must have been vacant or
substantially vacant as of August 20, 1981." Prior to evicting
tenants from a "substantially vacant" site, an applicant for a
50. New York City, N.Y., Dep't of City Planning, Zoning Resolution, Ch. 6, art.
XI, at § 116-50.
51. Id. at § 116-00. The general purposes of the District were described as
follows:
The Special Manhattan Bridge District established in this resolution is
designed to promote and protect the public health, safety and general wel-
fare. These general goals include, among others, the following specific
purposes:
(a) to preserve the residential character of the community and encourage the
development of new housing on sites which require minimal residential
relocation;
(b) to promote the opportunities for people to live in close proximity to em-
ployment centers in a manner which is consistent with existing community
patterns;
(c) to provide an incentive for the creation of new community facility space
which is required to meet the unique needs of this community;
(d) to permit new construction within the area which is sensitive to the ex-
isting urban design character of the neighborhood;
(e) to provide an incentive for a mixture of income groups in the new devel-
opment so as to not substantially alter the mixture of income groups pres-
ently residing in the neighborhood;
(f) to promote the rehabilitation of the existing older housing stock, and
thereby provide a renewed housing resource meeting modern standards, at
the same time protecting the character and scale of the community;
(g) to promote the most desirable use of the land in the area and thus to
conserve the value of land and buildings and thereby protect the City's tax
revenues.
Id.
52. Id. at § 116-00(a).
53. Id. at § 116-50(1).
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol4/iss2/6
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special permit must demonstrate that no harassment of
tenants has occurred, that all tenants have been relocated and
that, to the extent possible, all relocation arrangements have
been made within the District."'
On April 14, 1983, the Board of Estimate granted a spe-
cial permit to Henry Street Partners (HSP) to construct a 21-
story residential building consisting of eighty-seven condo-
minium units which would provide housing for upper-middle
income and professional residents of Chinatown. 5 In order to
obtain additional floor space, HSP opted to contribute to the
development of community facility space, including a pool to
be deeded to the YMCA. 56 Additionally, HSP entered into a
restrictive declaration with the City binding any future own-
54. Id. at § 116-30(a), (c). This section requires that, before tenants may be
evicted from any building on a "substantially vacant" site, an applicant must submit
a tenant relocation plan to the New York City Department of Housing Preservation
and Development and to the affected community board. This relocation plan has to
include an affirmation that "no harassment of tenants has occurred," and that provi-
sions have been made to relocate the "tenants in the [SMBD] to the extent possible."
Id.
55. Brief for Respondent at 8, Asian Americans For Equality v. Koch, 128
A.D.2d 99, 514 N.Y.S.2d 939 (1st Dep't 1987) (No. 22491/83).
56. Several key district zoning amendments permit increases in the basic floor
area ration (F.A.R.) as bonuses to developers. [F.A.R. expresses the relationship be-
tween the amount of floor area permitted in a building and the area of the lot on
which the building stands.] Thus, developers who construct new housing in the dis-
trict may increase the amount of permissible F.A.R. by providing any one (or a com-
bination) of three bonus amenities to the community:
(1) space for community facilities, which the regulations define as senior citi-
zen centers, day care facilities, educational facilities, or a combination thereof
resulting in a bonus of up to seven square feet for every square foot of floor
area which is used as commuity facility space, proportionate to the total floor
area permitted on the zoning lot;
(2) dwelling units for low and moderate income facilities resulting in a bonus
of up to two square feet for every square foot of floor area which is used for
dwelling units for low and moderate income families, proportionate to the
total floor area permitted on the zoning lot; and/or
(3) rehabilitation of existing substandard housing resulting in a bonus of up
to six square feet for every square foot of floor area which is demolished in a
granting rehabilitation development lot when both are developed in conjunc-
tion, proportionate to the total floor area permitted on the zoning lot of the
new receiving development.
In no event may the total F.A.R. of any new development, under provisions (1), (2),
or (3) of this section exceed 7.5. SMBD, §§ 116-01, -11, -12, -20, & -21.
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ers of the property, and also agreed to contribute $500,000 to
the New York City Department of Housing Preservation and
Development to rehabilitate or subsidize low- and moderate-
income housing within the District." The City, though, has
not to date created any program or procedure for allocating
these funds to the construction or rehabilitation of a quantifi-
able number of lower-income units.5
8
Asian Americans for Equality (Asian Americans), a non-
profit organization, brought this action seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief, challenging the constitutionality of the
zoning amendments adopted by the Board of Estimate which
established the SMBD. The plaintiffs claim that this case
presents a pattern of "de facto exclusionary zoning," 59 and al-
lege that the zoning ordinance does not conform to the Study,
that the Study is not a "well-considered plan," and that the
Study does not consider city-wide or regional needs.60
IV. The Lower Court Findings
In September, 1983, the plaintiffs, Asian Americans, insti-
tuted a class action suit for declaratory and injunctive relief
based on four causes of action: (1) that the zoning ordinance
creating the SMBD was unconsititutional under New York
law since it was not the product of a "well-considered" plan
nor responsive to the need outlined by the Study; 1 (2) for a
directive to the defendant City agencies to create a new plan
which provides a realistic opportunity for the construction of
low- and moderate-income housing, as it should in its exercise
to provide for the general welfare of the community; " (3) for
the revocation of the permit granted under the SMBD
amendment to HSP, since the proposed develoment will con-
sist solely of luxury dwellings,63 and (4) for an order enjoining
57. Asian Americans, 128 A.D.2d at 107, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 945.
58. Brief for Respondent at 8, Asian Americans For Equality v. Koch, 128
A.D.2d 99, 514 N.Y.S.2d 939 (1st Dep't 1987) (No. 22491/83).
59. Id. at 22.
60. Id. at 24.
61. Asian Americans, 129 Misc. 2d at 70, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 840.
62. Id.




any tax abatement, reduction or credit to the HSP project in
the SMBD because it does not provide for the construction or
significant rehabilitation of low-income housing in China-
town.6 " The defendant City, before submitting its answer,
moved to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.
The Supreme Court of New York County, J. Saxe writing
the opinion, held that Asian Americans' first three causes of
action challenging the validity of the zoning amendment and
the special permit were valid causes of action.6 5 The fourth
cause of action was held not to be "sufficiently matured so as
to constitute a justiciable controversy. ' '66
The court began its analysis by recognizing the strong
presumption of validity and constitutionality that is attached
to legislation enacted by a municipality.6 7 Specifically, the
court interpreted New York General City Law Section 208 to
require "that consideration must be given to the needs of the
community as a whole."6 9 Moreover, "once a priority commu-
nity need has been identified, a developmental scheme which
ignores or does not make reasonable provisions to meet that
need [low-income housing] violates the constitutional or stat-
utory mandate to regulate for the health, safety, and welfare
of community." ' Thus, a case by case analysis of whether a
Asian Americans, the New York Court of Appeals annulled the special permit issued
to HSP because the defendant City had failed to make an environmental analysis
that took into consideration the environmental requirements required by the regula-
tions promulgated by the City of New York. Chinese Staff and Workers Assoc. v. City
of New York, 111 A.D.2d 1081, 491 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1st Dep't 1985), rev'd 68 N.Y.2d
359, 502 N.E.2d 176, 509 N.Y.S.2d 499 (1986).
64. Asian Americans, 129 Misc. 2d at 90, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 852.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 90, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 853.
67. Id. at 75, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 843 (citing Lighthouse Shores, Inc. v. Town of
Islip, 41 N.Y.2d 7, 359 N.E.2d 337, 390 N.Y.S.2d 827 (1976); S.E. Nichols Herkimer
Corp. v. Village of Herkimer, 38 A.D.2d 456, 330 N.Y.S.2d 747 (4th Dep't 1972)).
68. New York General City Law, § 20, subdivision 25, requires that zoning reso-
lutions be "designed to promote the public health, safety and general welfare and
shall be made with reasonable consideration, among other thing, to the character of
the district . . .in accord with a well-considered plan." N.Y. Gen. City Law § 20,
subd. 25 (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1987).
69. Asian Americans, 129 Misc. 2d at 75, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 843 (citing Udell v.
Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463. 469, 235 N.E.2d 897, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1968)).
70. Asian Americans, 129 Misc. 2d at 75, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 843. See, Kurzius v.
19871
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zoning resolution is designed to promote public health, safety
and welfare, and whether it is a proper exercise of police
power, is necessary and must be undertaken.71
The court proceeded to juxtapose the findings of the
Study with Berenson's two-part test to determine whether
this zoning amendment was constitutional.72 Although it
noted that this zoning amendment was introduced with the
purpose of promoting residential construction, and that it in-
cluded an incentive program to allow an increase in the pre-
sent density requirements in the SMBD 7 3 the court neverthe-
less found enough evidence to place an affirmative duty upon
the municipality to assure that the zoning amendment met
the stricter standards enunciated in Mount Laurel I.71
While admitting that New York had not previously ac-
cepted a standard which imposed affirmative obligations upon
municipalities,75 the court held that under the standards set
in New York's Berenson decision and New Jersey's Mount
Laurel decisions, the plaintiffs in Asian Americans had valid
causes of action. Determining that Berenson had been ineffec-
tive to date, the lower court imposed a heavier burden on mu-
nicipalities to accept the Mount Laurel rationale by imposing
upon municipalities in New York an affirmative obligation to
provide low- and moderate-income housing.76 Thus, the lower
court held that the plaintiffs' allegations in their complaint
were sufficient to defeat the defendant City's motion to
Upper Brookville, 51 N.Y.2d 338, 414 N.E.2d 680, 434 N.Y.S.2d 180 (1980), cert. de-
nied, 450 U.S. 1042; Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236,
378 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975); Golden v. Planning Board of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285
N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 422 (4th Dep't), appeal dismissed, 509 U.S. 1003 (1972).
71. Id. (citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Corp., 272 U.S. 365, 387
(1926)).
72. Id. at 85-88, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 849-51.
73. Id. at 72, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 841.
74. Id. at 82, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 848. The evidence thus suggests that New York's
attempts to serve its people's general welfare, particularly the needs for adequate
housing by persons of low- and moderate-income, by focusing on whether there exists
a properly balanced and well ordered plan for the community, has been unsuccessful
in promoting these people's interests.
75. Id. at 76, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 844.





The lower court, however, also had to overcome the pres-
ence of a case with similar facts, Suffolk Housing Services v.
Town of Brookhaven. Instead of distinguishing Suffolk
Housing from the case at bar, J. Saxe declared himself not
bound by the holding of the former decision because, since the
court in Suffolk Housing did not have appellate jurisdiction,
its decision was not binding upon him under the principles of
stare decisis.79
V. The Appellate Court Holding
A. Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action; Whether the Zoning
Ordinance was Constitutional
In May 1987, J. Ross writing for a 3-2 majority of the Su-
preme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, modified
the lower court's holding by dismissing the plaintiffs' first two
causes of action, and affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs'
fourth cause of action. 0 The majority held that the District
zoning amendments conformed to the principles set forth in
Berenson, and therefore were constitutional."1
The appellate court began its analysis with the premise
that a zoning ordinance carries with it a strong presumption
of constitutionality,"2 and, as the dissent points out, the bur-
den of proof falls on the person challenging the zoning ordi-
77. Id.
78. 109 A.D.2d 323, 491 N.Y.S.2d 396 (1985).
79. Asian Americans, 129 Misc. 2d at 80, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 846.
80. Asian Americans, 128 A.D.2d at 113, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 948. The plaintiffs'
third cause of action concerning HSP's special permit was now moot because the
Court of Appeals had invalidated the permit on environmental grounds. Chinese
Staff, 111 A.D.2d 1081, 491 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1st Dep't 1985), rev'd, 68 N.Y.2d 359, 502
N. E.2d 176, 509 N.Y.S.2d 499 (1986).
In addition, the plaintiffs reserved their appeal on their fourth cause of action
until such time as it became ripe and justiciable. Brief for Respondent at 1, Asian
Americans For Equality v. Koch, 128 A.D.2d 99, 514 N.Y.S.2d 939 (1st Dep't 1987)
(No. 22491/83).
81. Id. at 119, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 952.
82. Id. at 101, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 941 (citing Town of Huntington v. Park Shore
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nance to demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that such
an ordinance is unconstitutional."
The majority applied the two-part test in Berenson 84 to
the zoning ordinance at issue to determine whether the plain-
tiffs had successfully rebutted the ordinance's strong pre-
sumption of constitutionality. 5 Throughout its opinion, the
appellate court utilized the facts it believed were relevant in
establishing whether a well-considered plan actually existed. 6
The majority pointed to the Planning Commission's consulta-
tion with urban planners, architects, and engineers.8 It also
acknowledged the Chairman of the Planning Commission's af-
fidavit as further evidence of a well-considered plan."8 The
court decided that these acts, coupled with provisions in the
zoning amendments that appear to strike a responsive note to
the dilemma facing low-income housing, demonstrated that
"forethought ha[d] been given to the [Chinatown] commu-
nity's land use problems. ' 89 The use by the Planning Commis-
83. Asian Americans, 128 A.D.2d at 127, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 957 (citing Robert E.
Kurzius, Inc v. Incorporated Village of Upper Brookville, 51 N.Y.2d 338, 344, 414
N.E.2d 680, 682-83, 434 N.Y.S.2d 180, 182 (1980)). Zoning ordinances are susceptible
to constitutional challenge if they are "properly arbitrary and unreasonable, having
no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare." Village
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926). But as the court in Beren-
son pointed out, "the validity of a zoning ordinance depends on the facts of the par-
ticular case and whether it is 'really designed to accomplish a legitimate public pur-
pose.'" Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 107, 341 N.E.2d 236, 240,
378 N.Y.S.2d 672, 678 (citing Matter of Wulfsohn v. Burden, 241 N.Y. 288, 299, 150
N.E. 120, 123 (1925)).
84. See supra notes 21-33 and accompanying text.
85. Asian Americans, 128 A.D.2d at 116-19, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 951-52.
86. Asian Americans, 128 A.D.2d at 102-07, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 941-45.
87. Id. at 102, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 942.
88. The affidavit stated in part:
At the same time, the... Planning Commission recognized that the majority
of the area residents are low income people, and realized that the wholesale
redevelopment of the area's housing stock would deprive these people of the
limited housing opportunities still available to them. Therefore, the District
regulations were drafted to provide for development that is infill in nature;
that is, limited to vacant or substantially vacant sites, rather than redevelop-
ment oriented.
Id. at 103-04, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 942.
89. Id. at 106, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 944 (quoting Blumberg v. City of Yonkers, 41
A.D.2d 300, 305, 341 N.Y.S.2d 977, 983, appeal dismissed, 32 N.Y.2d 896, 300 N.E.2d
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol4/iss2/6
ASIAN AMERICANS
sion of "expert assistance"9 was held to be evidence that the
proposed zoning change "was the result of comprehensive
planning.""' In addition, HSP's apartment building would al-
legedly be partially occupied by private medical offices, thus
increasing the availability of medical care to the residents of
the SMBD.9" Thus, the Appellate Court found the HSP per-
mit valid because the availability of these new apartment
units would open up older housing now occupied by the up-
per-middle income people that were to be lured by HSP's pro-
ject.9 3 Moreover, the majority found support for their position
that the zoning ordinance made provisions to relocate, "to the
extent possible," those tenants in the SMBD who may have to
be displaced.9"'
Furthermore, the appellate court also relied upon the
findings of the New York Court of Appeals in an earlier action
concerning this same zoning ordinance, Lai Chun Chan Jin v.
Board Of Estimate of the City of New York (Jin).e6 Specifi-
cally, the Court of Appeals in Jin found that the creation of
the District (and therefore the zoning ordinance) resulted
from a well-considered plan.' Although the majority in Asian
Americans recognized the existence of the Chinese Staff deci-
sion,97 it quickly distinguished its facts from the Jin case by
interpreting Chinese Staff as being "solely limited to annul-
154, 346 N.Y.S.2d 814 (1973)).
90. Id. at 102, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 942.
91. Id. (quoting Goodrich v. Town of Southhampton, 39 N.Y. 2d 1008, 1009, 355
N.E.2d 297, 298, 387 N.Y.S.2d 242, 243 (1976)).
92. Asian Americans, 128 A.D.2d at 107, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 945.
93. Id. at 107, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 944.
94. Id. See, New York City Zoning Resolution, supra note 7 at § 116-30(a).
95. 115 Misc. 2d 774, 454 N.Y.S.2d 601 (1982), rev'd, 92 A.D.2d 218, 460
N.Y.S.2d 28 (ist Dep't 1983), afl'd, 62 N.Y.2d 900, 467 N.E.2d 523, 478 N.Y.S.2d 859
(1984).
96. Asian Americans, 128 A.D.2d at 118, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 951. The Court of Ap-
peals in Jin stated, in part, "that the proposed revision and the effect it would have
upon the health, safety and welfare of the affected community was considered before
its adoption and that study fulfilled the requirement that the revision be adopted
pursuant to a well-considered plan .... Jin, 62 N.Y.2d at 903, 467 N.E.2d 523, 524-
25, 478 N.Y.S.2d 859, 861.
97. 111 A.D.2d 1081, 491 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1st Dep't 1985), rev'd, 68 N.Y.2d 359,
502 N.E.2d 176, 509 N.Y.S.2d 499 (1986); see also supra note 63.
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ling the special permit granted to HSP." s
In light of these facts, the majority of the Appellate Divi-
sion concluded that the zoning ordinance was a product of a
well-considered plan that took into consideration, inter alia,
the regional needs of the SMBD 99 Therefore, the District zon-
ing amendments were valid under the standards established
by Berenson, and hence the plaintiffs' first cause of action was
dismissed.100
B. Plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action: Does the City have
an Affirmative Obligation to Provide Affordable Housing
to Low- and Moderate-Income People in Exercising Its
Power for the General Welfare of the Community?
The appellate court reviewed the lower court's adoption
and application of the principles established in Mount Lau-
rel'0' and refused either to adopt or apply them to this case." 2
The majority adamantly stated that the Mount Laurel deci-
sions were not based on New York law but rather on "an in-
terpretation of the provisions of the law and Constitution of
the State of New Jersey."' 03 It chastised the lower court not
only for applying the affirmative obligation principles enunci-
ated in Mount Laurel I and II, but also because the fact pat-
tern in the Mount Laurel cases was not "by the widest stretch
of the imagination applicable to New York City's record for
providing for low and moderate income housing."'' 4 Moreover,
the appellate court noted that legal commentators have char-
acterized the Mount Laurel decisions as "the most extreme
treatment of the issue of exclusionary zoning in the country
98. Id. at 111. 514 N.Y.S.2d at 947. The majority notes that "nowhere in their
[Chinese Staff] opinion did the Court of Appeals discuss ... whether the City of New
York properly exercised its zoning power in creating the District . Id.
99. Id. at 118, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 951.
100. Id. at 119, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 952.
101. Mount Laurel I and II, among other things, placed the responsibility for
providing a realistic opportunity for low- and moderate-income housing on munici-
palities. See supra notes 11-19 and accompanying text.
102. Asian Americans, 128 A.D.2d at 115, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
103. Id. at 116, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 950.




.... 105 and labeled those decisions as essentially legislative
judgments. 10 6
The majority distinguished the Mount Laurel cases from
Asian Americans by pointing out that New Jersey case law
had established that the "applicable housing region or regions
to which the Mount Laurel obligations apply was larger than
four counties. ' 10 7 Thus, the majority held that Mount Laurel
was inapplicable here since the size of the District was but a
fourteen block area, and "every area as small as the District
need not contain specific provisions for the construction of
low-and moderate-income housing." 108 The appellate court
further stated that it found "the applicable zoning district
may well be the entire City of New York, not a 14 to 20 block
District."'0o
The appellate court then turned its attention to New
York case law. Once again, it relied on Berenson to justify its
conclusion and cited a passage which hence has become well-
settled law: zoning is a legislative matter and courts should
not become regional planners." The majority also relied upon
the fact that Berenson imposed no requirement that each dis-
trict must contain some sort of housing balance."' Rather, the
concern was directed toward whether the town itself was a
105. Id. at 115, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 950 (quoting Rice, Zoning and Land Use, 37
Syracuse L. Rev. 747, 750 (1986)).
106. Id. at 116, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
107. Id. (quoting Morris City Fair Housing Council v. Boonton Township, 209
N.J. Super 393, 422, 507 A.2d 768, 784 (1985)).
108. Asian Americans, 128 A.D.2d at 118, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 952.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 117, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 951 (citing Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38
N.Y.2d 102, 111, 341 N.E.2d 236, 243, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672, 682 (1975)).
Zoning ... is essentially a legislative act. Thus, it is quite anomalous that a
court should be required to perform the tasks of a regional planner. To that
end, we look to the Legislature to make appropriate changes in order to fos-
ter the development of programs designed to achieve sound regional planning
Berenson, 38 N.Y.2d at 111, 341 N.E.2d at 243, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 682.
111. Asian Americans, 128 A.D.2d at 117, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 951.
"Our concern is not whether the zones, in themselves, are balanced communities, but
whether the town itself, as provided for by its zoning ordinances, will be a balanced
and integrated community ...." Berenson, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 109, 341 N.E.2d 236, 242,
378 N.Y.S.2d 672, 680.
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balanced and integrated community. " 2
In this light, the appellate court dismissed the plaintiffs'
second cause of action"' on the grounds that the Mount Lau-
rel decisions were essentially legislative judgments, and ex-
pressed support for the lower court decision reached in Suf-
folk Housing."'
VI. The Dissent
A. The Constitutionality of the Zoning Ordinance
The dissent, written by J. Carro," 6 relied heavily on the
factual findings of the Study,"6 as opposed to the majority's
substantial reliance on how the Study was conducted," 7 and
vehemently disagreed with the majority's holding that the
plaintiffs had failed to state a valid cause of action." 8
Although zoning ordinances are accorded a strong pre-
sumption of constitutionality, and their unconstitutionality
must be demonstrated "beyond a reasonable doubt,"" 9 the
dissent points out that the Court of Appeals in Kurzius v.
Upper Brookville stated that a zoning ordinance may be in-
validated "if it is demonstrated that ... it was enacted with-
out giving proper regard to local and regional housing needs
and has an exclusionary effect."' 2 ° It is in this light that the
dissent intertwines the factual findings of the Study with Ber-
112. Asian Americans, 128 A.D.2d at 117, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 951.
113. Id. at 119, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 952.
114. Id. at 116, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
115. The remaining Justice, J. Asch, dissented from the majority opinion but
only partly concurred with the dissent of J. Carro. J. Asch would have remanded the
case for trial, but only on the limited issue of "whether New York City gave adequate
consideration to the need for low-cost housing." Id. at 146-47, 514 N.Y.S.2d 969.
116. Id. at 120-24, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 952-55.
117. Id. at 102-05, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 941-44.
118. Id. at 126, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 956. It must be remembered that this matter
reached this court on the question of whether the plaintiffs have valid causes of ac-
tion. The dissent fervently argued that plaintiffs had "cogently demonstrated that a
question of fact exist[ed]" since the plaintiffs had illustrated serious deficiencies in
the Study and whether it satisfies the Berenson test. Id. at 146, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 969.
119. Id. at 127, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 957.
120. Id. at 131, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 960; see Ktirzius v. Upper Brookville, 51 N.Y.2d





The dissent proceeded to examine the numerous facts
and figures established by the Study. The Study analyzed
data on expected immigration levels of Chinese to New York
City,12' on income of New York City's Chinese population,2
and on Chinatown's housing facilities.'2 3 The Study con-
cluded, inter alia, that additional and rehabilitated housing
was needed by low- and moderate-income people in the
area.'" Nevertheless, the Study cautioned that further study
was necessary prior to any long-range planning.'1 5
Next, the dissent perused the zoning amendment and
found that, notwithstanding the various provisions contained
therein to stimulate development within the SMBD, the
amendment itself provides no requirement that new or reha-
bilitated housing be set aside for low- and moderate-income
people in the area.' 8 In particular, the dissent appeared as-
tonished that, despite the Study's prediction, absent public
subsidies rehabilitated units will be beyond the means of low-
and moderate-income families.'2 7 The dissent expressed con-
cern that the status of such housing in the amendment was
relegated to mere "amenities.' 2 8 Moreover, noting that the
Study made only a passing reference to community facilities,
121. Asian Americans, 128 A.D.2d at 122, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 954; see also Study,
supra note 8, at 9-14.
122. Asian Americans, 128 A.D.2d at 122, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 954; see also Study,
supra note 8 at 31-38.
123. Asian Americans, 128 A.D.2d at 122, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 954; see also Study,
supra note 8 at 41-45.
124. Asian Americans, 128 A.D.2d at 122, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 954; see also Study,
supra note 8, at 57.
125. Asian Americans, 128 A.D.2d at 122, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 954; see also Study,
supra note 8, at 56-57.
126. Asian Americans, 128 A.D.2d at 122, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 955; see also Zoning
Resolution, supra note 7.
127. Asian Americans, 128 A.D.2d at 123, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 955.
128. Id. at 124, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 955.
While the stated purposes nowhere mention the goal of providing low- and
moderate-income housing, despite the Study's documentation of that need,
specific mention is made in the regulations' purposes of providing community
facility space. Even more disturbing is the fact that the most generous bonus
incentive granted to developers is the bonus for developing community
space. . . .Yet, the 1979 Study made only a passing reference to community
1987]
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J. Carro was disturbed by the fact that the bonus F.A.R. pro-
visions lean least towards providing incentives to developing
dwelling units for low and moderate-income facilities, while
providing the "most generous" provisions towards community
facilities. 12 9
In its application of Berenson's two-part test to these
findings, the dissent noted the Study's "absolute failure" to
take into account the regional needs for housing. 30 J. Carro
also expressed skepticism that the provision in the zoning
amendment to provide dwelling units for low- and moderate-
income families would actually provide such units.1 3' Further-
more, J. Carro was concerned over the possible displacement
of families in the SMBD. He found that, although the ordi-
nance provided that any developer's relocation plan be within
the SMBD "to the extent possible," it was "highly unrealis-
tic" that relocation would occur within the SMBD due to the
low vacancy rate.132 The dissent concluded that there was evi-
dence that the zoning ordinance was "poorly thought-out,"
and therefore not a well-considered plan. 133
Finally, the dissent dismissed the statement by the Court
of Appeals in Lai Chun Chan Jin v. Board of Estimate,3
that the SMBD was adopted in conformance with a well-con-
sidered plan. 35 J. Carro distinguished Jin by noting that the
SMBD was not the subject of litigation in that case and, since
petitioners had not presented any arguments to that end, the
Court of Appeals remark was deemed not to have a preclusive
facilities . ..
Id. at 141, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 966 (Carro, J. dissenting).
129. Id. at 122, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 954.
130. Id. at 144-45, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 968.
131. Id. at 141, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 966. J. Carro goes so far as to state that "it is
highly questionable that the incentive provided in the regulations for furnishing low-
income housing is a meaningful and realistic zoning measure, one 'really designed to
accomplish a legitimate public purpose.'" Id. (quoting Berenson, 38 N.Y.2d at 107,
378 N.Y.S.2d at 678).
132. Asian Americans, 128 A.D.2d at 140, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 966.
133. Id. at 145, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 968.
134. 115 Misc. 2d 744, 454 N.Y.S.2d 601 (1982), rev'd, 92 A.D.2d 218, 460
N.Y.S.2d 28 (1st Dep't 1983), aff'd, 62 N.Y.2d 900, 467 N.E.2d 523, 478 N.Y.S.2d 859
(1984).




effect. 136 In fact, the dissent points out that the Court of Ap-
peals recognized in Chinese Staff that a "separate constitu-
tional challenge to the SMBD regulations .. is sub judice in
the Appellate Division, First Department [Asian
Americans] ."137
B. The Affirmative Obligation
The dissent found it unnecessary to study New Jersey's
case law to determine whether New York municipalities have
an affirmative obligation to provide housing to low- and mod-
erate-income families. J. Carro found such an obligation in
Berenson. 1 8
Specifically, the dissent interpreted the second part of the
Berenson test to require "a balancing of the local desire to
maintain the status quo within the community and the
greater public interest that regional needs are met."' 39 Cou-
pled with Berenson's emphasis that the locality assess both
the "quantity and quality" of needed housing"" and the "so-
cial and economic" considerations of the community,"' J.
Carro determined that Berenson imposed an affirmative obli-
gation to provide low-income housing to those who needed
it."' Thus, he concluded that there were "substantial deficien-
cies" in the amendment because many of the provisions were
"irrational" and did "not appear to meet even the stated
goals" of the amendment.14 3
Furthermore, J. Carro pointed to the majority's sole at-
tention to one prong of the two-part test in Berenson.'4
While the majority concentrated on attempting to establish
136. Id.
137. Id. at 137, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 963 (citing Chinese Staff, 68 N.Y.2d at 362 n.1,
502 N.E.2d 176, 177, 509 N.Y.S.2d 499, 500 (1986)).
138. Asian Ameri'ans, 128 A.D.2d at 130-31, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 959.
139. Id. at 130, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 959 (quoting Berenson, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 110, 341
N.E.2d at 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 681 (1975)).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 130-31, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 959.
143. Id. at 146, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 969.
144. Id. at 137-38, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 964.
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the existence of a well-considered plan, it did not discuss what
the region consisted of nor what regional considerations were
made, pursuant to Berenson's second prong.'4" In applying
the Berenson test, the majority argued that the relevant
"community" was New York City, not the SMBD. l '4 In addi-
tion, the majority stated that in New York City any estab-
lished special district need not contain a housing balance as
long as the City of New York, as a whole, provided such.1 7
The dissent ridicules the majority's declaration that a study
based on only a 14-block area of the city satisfied the Beren-
son requirement of a well-considered plan encompassing all of
New York City.1 48 Hence, the dissent concluded that the
plaintiffs had demonstrated that a material question of fact
existed via valid causes of action, and thus the plaintiffs de-
served their day in court.'4"
VII. Analysis
The plaintiffs in Asian Americans challenge the constitu-
tionality of the zoning ordinance at bar by offering substantial
evidence that alleges that the ordinance did not meet the
standards established in Berenson. They point to the Study's
finding that there is a critical need for affordable housing in
Chinatown,' and to the Study's failure to adequately address
these needs.15 1 In addition, the plaintiffs point out that the
zoning ordinance provides only a de minimus provision for the
construction of housing for low- and moderate-income hous-
145. Id. In its concluding remarks, the majority states that they "find the appli-
cable zoning district may very well be the entire city of New York, not a 14 to 20
block District, or even a borough, within the entire City."
146. Id. at 137, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 964.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 146, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 969.
150. Brief for Respondent at 3, Asian Americans For Equality v. Koch, 128
A.D.2d 99, 514 N.Y.S.2d 939 (1st Dep't 1987) (No. 22491/83). See also Study, supra
note 8.
In particular, the Study predicted that the demand for low-income housing
would increase over the years in view of expected higher levels of immigration into
Chinatown. Study, supra note 8, at 13.




ing, and an optional provision at that.'52 Meanwhile, the most
generous bonus provision is for community facility space,'53 a
need not documented in the Study.
In applying the Berenson test, the Appellate Court ma-
jority concentrated on the "extensive" effort behind the Study
and certain provisions found in the ordinance to protect the
low- and moderate-income families. 54 A close examination of
the zoning resolution though, reveals that despite New York
City's insistence that the zoning resolution here was well-con-
sidered by virtue of the Study, such a causal connection does
not necessarily translate into Berenson's "properly balanced
and well-ordered plan." Here, the incentives for lower-income
housing are so inadequate that no developer in the SMBD will
opt to exercise the option to develop lower-income housing
when he can opt to build community space for a larger F.A.R.
bonus. 55 In effect, the incentives are grossly inadequate in
furthering housing for low- and moderate-income families. All
this supports the logic that the Appellate Division's reliance
upon Chinese Staff was erroneous and should be rejected.
Furthermore, there is no need to analyze any case law
other than that of New York. New York case law, liberally
interpreted under Berenson, adequately supports imposing an
affirmative obligation upon municipalities to meet the needs
of low- and moderate-income families. According deference to
the legislature cannot justify an abdication of judicial respon-
sibility to determine whether the zoning power has been exer-
cised fairly and rationally. 5 6 Zoning provisions must have a
substantial relationship to the public health, safety or general
152. Brief for Respondent at 6, Asian Americans.
153. See supra, note 58.
154. Asian Americans, 128 A.D.2d at 102-04, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 942-43.
155. J. Asch, concurring in part in the dissent, wryly commented:
It seems fairly obvious that any real estate developer who can read a profit
and loss statement is going to choose the plan which gives the larger bonus of
floor space. Thus, in the alternatives presented by the zoning resolution there
is a built-in financial prejudice against the building of low-cost housing.
Id. at 147, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 970.
156. Golden v. Planning Board of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334
N.Y.S.2d 422 (4th Dep't), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
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welfare.157 The zoning power must be exercised in pursuit of
some valid public purpose and cannot serve to justify arbi-
trary exclusionary efforts.
Unfortunately, the New York Appellate Court's refusal to
impose an affirmative obligation to provide housing for low-
and moderate-income families in Asian Americans has al-
ready influenced the New York Court of Appeals in Suffolk
Housing. That court affirmed the lower court's holding by not
ordering the Town of Brookhaven to affirmatively facilitate
development of low- to moderate-income housing within its
geographical area.15 8 Nevertheless, it is worthy of note that
the Court of Appeals specifically pointed out that its holding
was predicated on the "affirmed findings" of the Appellate Di-
vision of the Supreme Court.15 9 The court indicated that this
decision should not "be read as revealing hostility to breaking
down even unconstitutional zoning barriers that frustrate the
deep human yearning of low-surroundings. '"1 I The court
pointed to the abstract character of the case because individ-
ual plaintiffs could not be located and their corresponding
housing needs could not be determined." 1 Thus, it would ap-
pear that under the right factual circumstances, the court
would be willing to entertain the thought of interpreting Ber-
enson as imposing an affirmative obligation upon municipali-
ties to provide low-income housing. The facts here at bar ap-
pear to be sufficiently persuasive as to be the "right factual
circumstance. 1 62
157. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
158. Suffolk Housing, 70 N.Y.2d 122, 517 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1987).
159. Id. at 131, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 926.
160. Id. at 131, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 927.
161. Id.
162. Alan Mallach, author of Inclusionary Housing Programs: Policies and Prac-
tices (1984), and numerous scholarly and legal articles on housing and planning is-
sues, opines that:
[iut appears that the appellate division has come to believe in a Platonic ideal
of land use planning in which the physical uses of the land have been severed
from their social and economic implications and in which two different hous-
ing types - single-family and multi-family - exist as generic ideal types inde-
pendent of any relationship to people or housing needs. This position, how-
ever, as reflected in Suffolk Housing Services, exists in a legalistic vacuum





For Asian Americans to be decided on the merits, it must first
hurdle the obstacles of New York civil procedure. It should
have been sufficient for the plaintiffs in Asian Americans to
demonstrate, as they did, that material questions of fact exist
concerning the validity of the zoning ordinance developed
from the Study. When the Study's conclusions, reached by the
defendant City agency, are largely ignored by the City's agen-
cies themselves, a question arises as to whether such ordi-
nance is the product of a well-considered plan. Asian Ameri-
cans is at a point in the litigation process where the plaintiffs
only need to demonstrate that valid causes of action exist, not
the resolution of those causes of action on their merits. This is
critical to reversing the Appellate Division's holding. The Ap-
pellate Court majority chose to ignore most of the procedural
issues in order to decide the causes of action meritoriously;
instead, they should have limited themselves to the much nar-
rower issue of simply whether a valid cause of action ex-
isted."'3 All of the recent exclusionary zoning cases without
exception were resolved after a trial on the merits,164 indicat-
ing that a valid cause of action had been successfully alleged.
Once Asian Americans successfully passes the procedural
issue, it can then concentrate on the facts at issue and demon-
strate that New York case law has been previously interpreted
with sufficient liberality to impose an affirmative obligation on
municipalities. Where adverse exclusionary effects of the chal-
lenged zoning resolution have a severe impact on an inner-city
ity of land use regulation. To ignore realities which are as fundamental as the
nature of housing needs and the economics of housing is likely to result in
bad law.
Mallach, The Tortured Reality of Suburban Exclusion: Zoning, Economics, and the
Future of the Berenson Doctrine, 4 Pace Envt'l L. Rev. 37, 65 (1986).
163. Id. at 146, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 969. It is worthy of note that J. Carro never
determined whether a "well-considered" plan actually existed. Instead, he properly
narrowed his scope to the motion at hand: a motion to dismiss.
164. Robert E. Kurzius v. Village of Upper Brookville, 51 N.Y.2d 338, 414
N.E.2d 680, 434 N.Y.S.2d 180 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042 (1981); Blitz v.
Town of New Castle, 94 A.D.2d 92, 463 N.Y.S.2d 832 (2d Dep't 1983); Suffolk Hous-
ing Services v. Town of Brookhaven, 109 A.D.2d 323, 491 N.Y.S.2d 396 (1985), aff'd,
70 N.Y.2d 122, 517 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1987).
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community in terms of displacement and where a critical need
for lower-income housing has been demonstrated, remedial
zoning amendments must reflect a well-balanced plan which
adequately considers community needs and thereby realisti-
cally encourages the construction, rehabilitation and preserva-
tion of such housing. The Court of Appeals should utilize
Asian Americans as a conduit to facilitate this long-needed
change in land-use policy in New York.
Paul Xavier Lima
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